I only skimmed the report halfway, I did find some inconsistencies and some interesting word choice.  The statement in the debriefing report:  " At approximately 8:15 p.m. Amtrak CETC stopped northbound MARC Train No. 442 with the intent of boarding the evacuated passengers.  Approximately 1,100 passengers transferred to Train 442, which departed at 8:51 p.m." is blantently incorrect.

 It's true that the broken down train 538 had been full, with approximately 1200 passengers.  Also true is that approximately 100 passengers took the broken down train as their rescue to New Carrolton station (I was on it).  However, stating that 1100 passengers boarded the first rescue train is wrong, and impossible according to the basic laws of science.  First, many passengers utilized (U.S.) 50 for hitch-hiking, called cabs or arranged to be picked up, or some walked and figured out that we were stopped almost immediately next to the Cheverly Metro station (we were just shy of a road bridge crossing from (U.S.) 50 to give access to the Metro).   From the look of the remaining crowd near the train on one hand, and the number of people I saw climb the wooded bank to (U.S.) 50 and start walking or enter cars, I'd say that at least a few hundred passengers found alternate rescue transportation. 

 Second, when the "rescue" train arrived it is my understanding that it already had passengers on it and it had fewer cars than the 538; further evidence that it would have been scientifically impossible to fit the "1100" people onto it.  The next day, one of my fellow regular riders told me that she rode in the locomotive on that train, and there were other horror stories, visible from where I stood on the ground by the rail lines, about the awful, overcrowded, unsafe conditions allowed by MARC/Amtrak on that rescue train.  I just wonder why this obvious, well known piece of information was disregarded in the final report by pretending that MARC/Amtrak accounted for all the original passengers.

In the days following the "hell train" I spoke with a representative from the FRA during one of my rides to work, and I listened to other passengers give him their accounts of the incident, recalling the terrible conditions of the rescue train and the same stories of passengers utilizing (U.S.) 50 for their own rescue - so if FRA knew passengers sought out other transportation, how can they possibly give MARC/Amtrak credit for rescuing all the original passengers?  And WHY do they do so?

Most of the rest of the details about what happened are close enough to the truth as I experienced and witnessed it.  Although, the memo states that Amtrak police arrived 35 minutes after the breakdown (page 5), while the debriefing states police arrived 42 minutes after the breakdown (breakdown at 6:20 on page 1, and police at 7:02 on page 2) - this is just an interesting discrepancy.

 I also find this line somewhat personally concerning: "As the delay continued, it became increasingly difficult for the MARC crew and Amtrak Police Officer to maintain crowd control." because I wonder what would have happened if more police were there?  Many of the passengers stayed aboard the train in the sweltering, unsafe conditions because of the threat of arrest if they were to break the emergency exits/windows for air or for trespassing on Amtrak property by exiting the train.

This is compelling testimony, and  it deserves a reply from the Maryland Transit Administration. We'll try to get one.