When a robbery is not a robbery
Erick Lee Spencer walked into a Baltimore County Jiffy Lube on the day after Christmas 2006, confronted a clerk and said, "Don't say nothing."
Tyrone Stinnette promptly handed the man money from the till. He testified in court that no weapon was revealed, and nothing else was said. But he concluded, "We got robbed."
The prosecutor asked if he believed the man had a weapon.
"I wasn't taking no chances," Stinnette replied.
Spencer was convicted of robbery, theft and assault and sentenced to 25 years in prison, without the possibility of parole, because he had two prior felony robbery convictions.
The suspect appealed, arguing that evidence was insufficient to support a robbery conviction. Today, the Maryland Court of Appeals agreed, and sent the case back to Baltimore County Circuit Court.
Read the Court of Appeals decision.
For more details:
The judges on the state's highest court embarked on an earnest discussion of what it means to rob someone. What about a bank robber who hands a teller a note saying, "Put money in the bag" and "not to hit an alarm, not to let anybody know," follow by "and no one will get hurt?"
Courts ruled that the defendant in the bank case was rightfully convicted of robbery because he implied fear.
But in Spencer's case, the court ruled that his "brief statement, by itself, would not cause an ordinary reasonable person to have felt apprehension that Spencer was about to apply force." The judges said a reasonable cashier would not have handed over money.
"To intimidate or threaten an individual to the extent necessary for the legal standard of robbery, something more is needed," the judges ruled. "If this Court were to accept the position advanced by the state, we would largely annul the common law distinction between robbery and theft."
Three judges dissented from the ruling, noting that unlike theft, "robbery is a crime against persons," which is what happened in the Jiffy Lube case. "The victim felt compelled to to part with the money or face a risk of escalation by Spencer," the dissenting judges wrote. "This is classic intimidation. A reasonable jury could infer from the testimony that Spencer was not benignly at Jiffy Lube that day to exchange money for an oil change..."
The judges also noted that many employers instruct their employees not to resist robbery attempts. They lauded the employee for refusing "to place his health or life in danger over mere money."
The judges concluded:
"Although I am not suggesting that Spencer is the very embodiment of Lex Luther, his conduct in this case could be viewed as a criminal calculation to hide in the margins of the distinctions between theft and robbery so as to minimize his downside exposure if, as, and when he might be brought to justice. If that was the case, the jury penetrated the charade and returned a sustainable verdict of guilty of robbery."
Categories: Baltimore County, Courts and the justice system



